Political Parties and the Tax Level in the American states: Two Regression Discontinuity Designs by Leandro M. de Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero
 
 
Political Parties and the Tax 
Level in the American states: 






















Department of Economics 
University of Bristol 
8 Woodland Road 
Bristol BS8 1TN Political Parties and the Tax Level in the American
states: Two Regression Discontinuity Designs ∗†








Our ﬁrst regression discontinuity design shows that whether the majority in the
House of Representatives is Republican or Democratic does not aﬀect the tax level.
This result goes against recent ﬁndings in the political economy literature. In another
regression discontinuity design, we ﬁnd that taxes are higher when governments are
uniﬁed (both the Governor and the majority in the state House belong to the same
party) than when they are divided. Another contribution of the paper is to investigate
under which conditions slim majorities (as opposed to close election) are appropriate
for a regression discontinuity design. (JEL D72, H71, R5)
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1If parties play a role in policy making, one would expect their inﬂuence over policy to
be related to the number of seats they hold in the state House and Senate, and the party
identity of the Governor. In particular, voting rules in the Legislatures make it such that a
party’s inﬂuence should change discontinuously once it has the required majority to pass or
block bills. In most Legislatures, a party with 50%+1 of the seats in either chamber has the
power to both propose, modify, and block the budget, and also to propose and block changes
to the tax level. This discontinuous change in party inﬂuence allows us to use a regression
discontinuity design to try to identify whether there is a causal link between the majority in
the Legislature and the state tax level.
The general idea of a regression discontinuity design in a political setting is that close
elections can be regarded as random (see Lee (2008)). We propose that slim majorities in
the state lower House can be regarded as random.1 Since we are focusing on slim majorities
instead of vote count, our design must pass an important test. For a slim majority of one
seat to be considered as random, at least one seat out of all the seats won by the majority
must have been won in a close election. If this is the case, the party identity of the majority
itself can be considered as random as a close election. On the other hand, if every seat
was won by a landslide majority, even an election result that delivers a majority of 50%+1
could not be considered as random. We have electoral return data at the state-district level
and show in Section 2.2 that slim majorities of one or two seats do satisfy the condition of
having at least one or two close district-level elections. Section 2.2 is a contribution on its
own because it allows future research to use slim majorities in the states’ Houses to identify
other causal relations of interest.
Under the identifying assumption that slim majorities can be considered as random,
we can therefore check whether there is a discontinuous increase in the tax level at the
1Every state’s Legislature (except for that of Nebraska) has two legislative chambers: a state Senate and
a state House. The Senate also plays an important role in writing and approving the budget, but, as we
discuss below in Section 1.3, only the state House lends itself to a regression discontinuity design.
2cutoﬀ Democratic control = 50%. We deﬁne Democratic control as the percentage of seats
held by the Democratic party in the state lower House. Above the cutoﬀ, the Democrats
have the majority in the state House; below the cutoﬀ, the Republicans have the majority.
If we observe a jump in the tax level at the 50% cutoﬀ, we can assign the higher tax
level to the Democrats holding the majority, and therefore interpret the jump as a causal
relationship. The identifying assumption implies that all confounding factors, observable
and unobservable, should on average be the same on both sides of the 50% cutoﬀ, so that
the diﬀerence in the outcome variable can only be attributed to the treatment eﬀect. An
interesting feature of the design is that we can test for discontinuities in observable covariates
as a way to check whether our “randomization” has worked well. The limitation of such a
design is that we are only able to identify a causal relation locally, at the 50% cutoﬀ. The
result is not generalizable to all the support.
We ﬁnd two important results with our regression discontinuity designs. The ﬁrst is that
we ﬁnd no discontinuity in the state tax level at the cutoﬀ Democratic control = 50%. We
describe this result in Section 3. The tests we perform indicate that our result is robust and
valid as a quasi-experiment. We therefore interpret this result as evidence against a causal
relationship between the partisan identity of the majority in the state House and the tax
level. This result is in contrast with recent results in the political economy literature (see
Besley and Case (2003) and Reed (2006)).2
On one hand, our ﬁrst result is in line with what Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) ﬁnd when
studying U.S. cities. They also use a regression discontinuity design and ﬁnd no evidence
that the partisan identity of the Mayor has an eﬀect on government size. On the other hand,
2Besley and Case (2003) ﬁnd that the higher the fraction of seats held by the Democratic party in the
state lower House, the higher the contemporaneous tax level. Their multivariate regression analysis includes
state and year ﬁxed eﬀects and time-varying state level controls. Reed (2006) also controls for state and time
ﬁxed-eﬀects but regresses ﬁve-year changes in the tax level on state characteristics and variables indicating
political control. He ﬁnds that Democratic control over the Legislature, measured as the fraction of the
ﬁve-year period in which Democrats controlled both state chambers, has a positive impact on the tax level.
3our ﬁrst result diﬀers from what Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) ﬁnds for Sweden. He looks at the
eﬀects of the partisan control of the local legislative and ﬁnd that left-leaning governments
do spend more.
One of the contributions of this paper is that instead of focusing exclusively on either
the legislative or the executive branch of government, we use regression discontinuity design
to investigate how the alignment between branches inﬂuences the size of government3.
We still use the identifying assumption that slim majorities can be regarded as random,
but we now look at whether this “randomization” delivered an uniﬁed or a divided gov-
ernment. In order to measure the degree of alignment between the Governor and the state
House, we use as our forcing variable the Governor’s strength, which we deﬁne as the per-
centage of seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the
current Governor, whether they be Democrat or Republican. Above the 50% cutoﬀ, the
government is uniﬁed; below the cutoﬀ, the government is divided.
The recent literature has found little evidence that the Governor’s partisan identity has
an eﬀect on the tax level.4 The Governor, however, plays an important role in setting the
budget. In many states, for example, the Governor’s oﬃce, or an independent agency usually
linked to the oﬃce, prepares the ﬁrst draft of the budget. This agenda-setting power may
have some inﬂuence over the budget. Moreover, most Governors have more power over the
state budget than the President has over the federal budget. This is the case because in
most states the Governor may veto particular lines, items, or words, or even trim values
in the budget approved by the state Legislature. This sort of veto power diﬀers from the
veto power that the American President (and a minority of Governors) has over a budget
3Other papers such as Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) use regression discontinuity design to investigate
the eﬀect of council size on government expenditure.
4Besley and Case (2003), Reed (2006), and Leigh (2008) ﬁnd no evidence that the party identity of the
Governor aﬀects the tax level. Besley and Case (1995) ﬁnd evidence that a Governor facing term limits
increases the tax level, but their result is not robust to extending the data set in time, as they do in
Besley and Case (2003).
4approved by Congress. The President only has the power to veto the federal budget as a
block.
The second result of this paper is that in the 38 states with the line item veto, we estimate
a signiﬁcant discontinuous increase of 13% in the tax level at the point at which Governor’s
strength crosses the 50% cutoﬀ.5 We present this result in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2 we
present the result that there is no discontinuity in the tax level in the sample of states with
the block veto.
In Section 1 we present the data. In Section 2 we discuss the design and our estimation
methods. In Section 3 and Section 4 we present the results of our two regression discontinuity
designs. We discuss our results in Section 5. Our interpretation of these results is that parties
do matter, but not in the way we tend to think of them: big government Democrats and
small government Republicans.
1 Data
Our full sample comprises 50 American states from 1960 to 2006. Most of our political, ﬁscal,
and population variables are the same as those used by Besley and Case (2003).6 We have
updated their sample from 1960 to 1998 with data from 1999 to 2006. The source of the new
data was the Census Bureau, Legislature websites, the website for the National Association
of State Budget Oﬃces (NASBO), and the website for the National Conference of State
5Two papers closely related to our second result are those of Holtz-Eakin (1988) and Besley and Case
(2003). Holtz-Eakin (1988) uses a panel from 1966 to 1983 and runs a ﬁxed eﬀect model in which a dummy for
the time invariant line item veto is interacted with a dummy for divided government and with other variables
indicating the partisan identity of the Governor. In contrast to our results, he ﬁnds that this interaction
dummy is positively correlated with the overall tax revenue, for both Democratic and Republican Governors.
Besley and Case (2003) have a longer data set, from 1960 to 1998, and interact a dummy for the line item
veto with a dummy for divided government (they also control for state and year eﬀect). In their estimates, a
divided government in a state with the line item veto is negatively correlated with tax revenues per capita.
See also Poterba (1994) and Alt and Lowry (1994) for a panel analysis of the role of divided government and
other institutional features on the American states.
6We are thankful to Timothy Besley and Anne Case for making their data sets available to us.
5Legislatures (NCSL). There is not enough data to include Alaska and Hawaii. Nebraska is
excluded for being the only unicameral state and for having a non-partisan Legislature. We
exclude 17 observations with independent Governors. We exclude Minnesota because until
1972 it had a non-partisan Legislature and its Governors were either oﬃcially independent
from 1982 to 2002 or are classiﬁed as such by Brandl (2000).7 We also exclude Arkansas,
California, and Rhode Island, because they all require a two-third majority in order to pass
the budget, which implies a diﬀerent cutoﬀ point at 66.6% of the seats in each chamber in
the Legislature, and there is not enough data to reliably reproduce our estimation procedure
at this cutoﬀ. Our working sample has 43 states from 1960 to 2006: 2004 observations (not
2021 because independent Governors are excluded).
In our sample, the average tax level in the American states is around 5% of GDP. The
tax level is deﬁned as the sum of state income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state
GDP. We also have data on total state expenditure, which averages at 10% of GDP. Much of
this expenditure is determined by Federal transfers and local programs, which are under the
control of neither the state Legislature nor the Governor. We will abstain from discussing
the role that the Federal and local governments have in state ﬁscal policy.8. Instead we focus
solely on tax revenue from state taxes.
We also show results with an alternative measure for the tax level: state taxes per capita.
However, taxes per capita seem to be more time dependent than tax revenues over GDP. This
can be seen in Table 1. The average taxes per capita across states in 1982-dollars during the
1960s is $354. This jumps to $560 in the 1970s and continues to increase thereafter. Taxes
7Democrat Rudy Perpich entered and won the race for Governor in 1981 running directly against the
Democratic candidate chosen in the primaries. Republican Arne Carson lost in all but one of the 87 state-
district primaries, but his name was replaced in the ballot after a scandal forced the chosen Republican
candidate to step down, and he became Governor in 1989. Jesse Ventura was the independent Governor
from 1999 to 2002. For a detailed account of contemporary Minnesota political history, see Brandl (2000)).
8We are assuming away how tax rates are set in federal units that take central government tax policy into
account. For a discussion, see Klor (2005). We are also assuming away how the partisan alignment between
states and the federal government may aﬀect federal transfer. For an empirical discussion on Spanish data,
see Sol´ e-Oll´ ea and Sorribas-Navarro (2008).
6over GDP are much more stable across the same period. We choose taxes over GDP as our
preferred dependent variable because it is potentially less vulnerable to outliers from the
1960s and to comparisons of estimates from observations of diﬀerent decades. Even when
using taxes over GDP, however, the 1960s is an outlier decade. Because of this, one of our
robustness checks is to estimate our results excluding this period.
Table 1: Diﬀerent measures of the states’ tax level
Measure 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
state taxes per capita (1982-dollars) 334 572 646 811 900
state taxes over state GDP (%) 4.4 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.6
Note: This sample comprises 2004 observations of states with the line item veto and states
with the block veto from 1960 to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The
tax level is measured as the total sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes. Each
entry is the average of all observations within a decade.
Table 2: Political parties and the adoption of income and/or corporate taxes
State and year Majority in the House Majority in the Senate Governor
States with line item veto
Connecticut (1970) Democrat Democrat Democrat
Florida (1972) Democrat Democrat Democrat
Illinois (1970) Republican Republican Republican
Michigan (1968) Republican Republican Republican
New Jersey (1962) Democrat Republican Democrat
Ohio (1972) Republican Republican Democrat
Pennsylvania (1971) Democrat Democrat Democrat
States with block veto
Indiana (1964) Republican Republican Democrat
Maine (1970) Republican Republican Democrat
Rhode Island (1970) Democrat Democrat Democrat
New Hampshire (1971) Republican Republican Republican
Note: Our sample comprises data on corporate and income tax revenue from 1960 to 2006.
An alternative measure to tax revenues over GDP or per capita would be to look at the
tax rates themselves. We do not have data on the changes in the tax rates, so we cannot
follow such a strategy. We do have data on tax revenues, however. So if the revenue of a
7certain tax goes from zero to a positive number from one year to the next, this means a
new tax has been adopted. As can be seen in Table 2, out of the eleven states that adopted
either income alone or both income and corporate taxes in the period 1960 to 2006, ﬁve had
a Democratic majority in the state House and six had a Republican majority in the state
House. Also note that out of the seven states with the line item veto, six adopted the new
taxes under an uniﬁed government. Out of the four states with the block veto, two adopted
new taxes under an uniﬁed government and two under a divided government. The adoption
of new taxes by diﬀerent government conﬁgurations seems to be in line with the econometric
results that we present in Sections 3.1, 4.1, and 4.2.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, we expect the eﬀect of the House being uniﬁed
with or in opposition to the Governor to be more evident in the states with the line item
veto. We therefore split our sample between states with the line item veto and states with
the block veto. Our sample has 34 states with the line item veto throughout the period 1960
to 2006. There are ﬁve states that have the block veto throughout as well: Indiana, North
Carolina, New Hampshire, Nevada, and Vermont. And there are four states that adopted
the line item veto during our sample period: Iowa, Washington, Virginia, and Maine.9 The
four states that changed status appear on the block veto subsample up to their adoption
of the line item veto, and then they appear on the line item veto subsample. In the cases
in which our forcing variable is Democratic control, there is no reason a priori to split the
sample according to the diﬀerences in veto power, so we provide results for the combined
sample as well.
We also have data on the following variables: state population, income, and unemploy-
ment rate; the average state property tax, which is not decided by the Legislature; the
political identity of the Governor; the partisan identity of the majority in the state Senate;
9Maine adopted the line item veto in 1995, and the remaining three states adopted it in 1969. For a
discussion on why states adopt the line item veto, see de Figueiredo Jr. (2003).
8whether or not the election was a midterm election; and election turnout. We also have
data on whether the state has other institutional features that may aﬀect the tax level:
supermajority requirements for a tax increase, and tax and expenditure limitations. We
follow standard practice and check these covariates for signiﬁcant discontinuities around
Democratic control = 50% and Governor′s strength = 50%.
Finally, we have data on state legislative election returns at the state district level from
1967 to 2003. These were provided by the ICPSR (Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research) and collected and organized by Carsey et al. (2008). We were unable
to ﬁnd state-district level data for the remaining years of our working sample. Also, as
Carsey et al. (2008) point out, due to various reasons, there is about 18% of missing values
for the variable that we are interested in: the margin of victory, deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the percentage of the votes that the winner received and the percentage of the vote
that the second-place candidate received in each state district. We end up with state-district
level data for 714 state-years.10
2 Regression discontinuity design
2.1 Design
Regression discontinuity is a quasi-experimental design. Its deﬁning characteristic is that
the probability of receiving treatment changes discontinuously as a function of one or more
underlying variables.11 The treatment, call it T, is known to depend in a deterministic way
on an observable variable, g, known as the forcing variable, T = f (g), where g takes on
a continuum of values. But there exists a known point, g0, where the function, f (g) , is
10Our working sample (with both the states with the line item veto and the states with the block veto)
has 2004 observations. An observation is a state in a year. Elections, however, only take place every two
years, so we only have election results for 1002 observations. This number is the basis for a comparison with
the number of observations for which we have state-district election returns data: 714.
11For a detailed review of the regression discontinuity in economics, see Lee and Lemieux (2009).
9discontinuous. 12 The main identifying assumption of the design is that the relation between
any confounding factor and g must be continuous at the cutoﬀ g0. If that is the case, the
only variable that is diﬀerent near both sides of the cutoﬀ is the treatment status. As a
result, the discontinuity in the outcome variable is identiﬁed as being caused only by the
variation in treatment status. One main caveat of the design is that it can only claim to
identify a causal relation locally, i.e. at the cutoﬀ.
In this paper, the forcing variable is either Democratic control or Governor’s strength,
and the outcome variable is the state tax level. If the forcing variable is above 50%, the
observation receives treatment. In the ﬁrst design, the treatment is a Democratic controlled
state House. In the second design, the treatment is an “uniﬁed government”. At each period,
a state is either assigned the treatment or not. For the observations in which the election for
the state House delivered a slim majority, we argue that the assignment of treatment was as
good as random. If this is the case, diﬀerences in the average tax level between the treated
group and the control group are an estimation of the treatment eﬀect.
2.2 Slim Majorities and Close Elections
Our regression discontinuity designs are based on the idea that slim majorities in state
Legislatures can be interpreted as randomly assigned. The party identity of the majority in
a Legislature, however, is not chosen in a single state-wide district in which the party with
50% +1 of the votes wins the majority. Instead, each state is divided into state-districts that
choose a representative to the state Legislature by a ﬁrst-past-the-post system.13 Therefore,
12More formally, the limits T + ≡ limg→g
+
0 E[T|g] and T − ≡ limg→g
−
0 E[T|g] exist and T +  = T −. It is
also assumed that the density of g is positive in the neighborhood of g0. There are two types of discontinuity
design: fuzzy and sharp. In sharp design, treatment is known to depend in a deterministic way on some
observed variables. In fuzzy design, there are also unmeasured factors that aﬀect selection into treatment.
Our case ﬁts the sharp design.
13Some states have multi-member districts. We include in our data used in Table 3 and 4 the multi-
member districts that have diﬀerent candidates for each post. We exclude from our data the free-for-all
multi-member districts, in which all candidates run together and those with the most votes win a seat.
10an important condition for a slim majority to be considered random is that at least a few
state-districts must have had close elections themselves.
The benchmark case is a legislative election in which each party has the same number
of secure seats, only one seat is competitive. Whichever party wins that seat, wins the
majority in the legislative chamber. If that seat was decided in a close election, then the
assignment of which party holds the majority in the legislative chamber is as random as
the election for the competitive seat itself. Lee (2008) discusses why close elections can be
considered as random and are therefore appropriate for regression discontinuity designs. The
rule-of-thumb deﬁnition of a close election by Lee (2008) is an election in which the margin
of victory was less than 5% of the votes in a particular district.
In Table 3, row 1 we look at legislative elections that delivered majorities - for either
Democrats or Republicans - of 1% of the seats (the average state House has 110 seats). In
this interval, we have state-district level data for 33 election years in diﬀerent states. In each
of these legislative elections, we counted the number of seats that were won with a margin
of victory of less than 5% of the votes. In all of these 33 legislative elections at least 1% of
the seats were decided by close elections. The results in row 1 indicate that slim majorities
of one or two seats can be regarded as random insofar as the district level election in the
competitive seats can be regarded as random. This implies that the exercise of using slim
majorities for a regression discontinuity design is a valid one. For majorities of one or two
seats, there seems always to be enough close election to make the result of which party gains
the majority random itself.
The other rows in Table 3 show what happens if we look at majorities of more seats. As
an example, let’s look at a majority of, say, 53% of the seats. If at least 3% of all seats were
the result of close district-level elections, then we say that the identity of the majority in that
election satisﬁes our randomness condition. Out of the 86 observations in that interval, 83%
satisfy the condition. Note also that our condition implies that the winner of the majority
11Table 3: Randomness condition for the state House
Democratic control Percentage of seats Number of Randomness condition
(%) that must be close elections observations (% of obs. in the interval)
49-51 1 33 100
48-52 2 59 93
47-53 3 86 83
46-54 4 117 73
45-55 5 132 67
44-56 6 161 59
43-57 7 203 53
Note: The data on election results by state district has been provided by Carsey et al. (2008).
We have election results by state district for 726 state-years. Election returns at the state-
district level are only available from 1967 to 2003, and within this periods there is about 18%
of missing values. Democratic control is deﬁned as the percentage of seats in the state House
of Representatives that belong to the Democrats. We deﬁne the randomness condition for a
majority in the state House to be that at least the percentage of seats above the 50% cutoﬀ
were close elections themselves at the state-district level. We deﬁne a close election to be an
election won with a margin of victory of less than 5% of the votes. Column 4 indicates the
percentage of the observations in that interval that satisfy the condition. Let’s use row 2 as an
example. In 93% of the 59 observations with a majority of up to 52% of the seats (Democratic
or Republican) at least 2% of the district-level elections for state House representative had a
margin of victory below 5% of the votes.
was uncertain. Our condition does not imply that the probability of gaining the majority is
the same for both parties. If, for example, the Democrats are sure to win half of the seats
by a landslide, they only need one of the close-election seats to go their way, whereas the
Republicans would need all close-election seats to go their way.
Had we enough data, the simplest way to implement a regression discontinuity design
would be to look at the diﬀerence between the average tax rate for the observations with
Democratic control in the interval (50%, 51%] and with Democratic control in the interval
(49%, 50%]. As we describe below in Section 2.4, we do present the results of this simple
average estimation. The sample in this interval is small, however, and the estimation of the
averages are subject to a large degree of sampling variability. In order to eﬃciently estimate
the discontinuity at the 50% cutoﬀ, we must include observations farther from the cutoﬀ.
This may seem restrictive, but it is a common feature of any regression discontinuity design.
The design only claims to identify causality in the limit, at the cutoﬀ. But in practice,
12observations that are not at the cutoﬀ are also included in the estimation. We discuss our
estimation procedures in Section 2.4 below.
Table 4: Randomness condition for the state Senate
Democratic control Percentage of seats Number of Randomness condition
in the Senate(%) that must be close elections observations (% of obs. in the interval)
49-51 1 19 89
48-52 2 46 86
47-53 3 73 79
46-54 4 94 71
45-55 5 130 61
44-56 6 149 56
43-57 7 176 51
Note: The data on election results by state district has been provided by Carsey et al. (2008).
We have election results by state senate districts for 679 state-years. Election returns at the
state-district level are only available from 1967 to 2003, and within this periods there is about
18% of missing values. Democratic control in the Senate is deﬁned as the percentage of seats
in the state Senate that belong to the Democrats. We deﬁne the randomness condition for a
majority in the state House to be that at least the percentage of seats above the 50% cutoﬀ
were close elections themselves at the state-district level. We deﬁne a close election to be an
election won with a margin of victory of less than 5% of the votes. Column 4 indicates the
percentage of the observations in that interval that satisfy the condition. Let’s use row 2 as an
example. In 86% of the 46 observations with a majority of up to 52% of the seats (Democratic
or Republican) at least 2% of the state Senate elections had a margin of victory below 5% of
the votes.
Our randomness condition is deﬁned according to an arbitrary threshold that deﬁnes as
close an election won by a margin of victory below 5% of the votes. Diﬀerent thresholds
would imply diﬀerent values for column 4 in Table 3. The broad picture would remain the
same, however. Slim majorities of a few seats can more easily be considered as the result of
a random process than majorities of many seats.
For any given “randomness condition”, one could estimate the discontinuity with the
methods described in Section 2.4 by restricting the sample to observations that satisfy the
condition. We have experimented with this alternative. We have estimated the discontinu-
ities in this paper with the restricted sample that satisﬁes our randomness condition. The
signiﬁcance and direction of the results do not change. We have therefore omitted them
13here. They are available on request.
In Table 4 we look at the state Senates instead. Even in row 1, we observe elections that
do not satisfy the randomness condition. A possible explanation for this diﬀerence between
the state Senates and Houses is the sheer number of seats. The state Houses have many more
seats up for election in any given electoral year than the state Senates. The state Houses
have an average of 110 seats and all seats are contested every two years. The state Senates
have an average of 40 seats and staggered elections, and only half of the seats are contested
at each biennial election. It is easier for all of the seats in a particular election for the state
Senate to have predictable results.
2.3 Forcing Variables
As we showed in the previous section, some slim majorities do not satisfy the randomness
condition. This is particularly a problem for the state Senates. If the party identity of the
majority is not random at the cutoﬀ, this implies that voters can manipulate our forcing
variable even at the cutoﬀ. To test for this, we look at the the density of our potential forcing
variables and check how they behave around the 50% cutoﬀ.
Figures 1 and 2 (particulary Figure 1) suggest that voters are able to manipulate the
composition of the Senate. In Figure 1 we can see that there are almost 50% more ob-
servations immediately to the left of the cutoﬀ compared with the number of observations
immediately to the right. This seems to suggest that voters are able to prevent slim Demo-
cratic majorities from controlling the state Senate. And if the voters are able to manipulate
the composition of the state Senate at the 50% cutoﬀ, we cannot interpret slim majorities
in the Senate as random. Figure 2 shows a less stark but similar picture.
In Figure 3 we can see that there is almost no diﬀerence between the number of obser-
vations in a Democratic controlled House and a Republican controlled House at the 50%
cutoﬀ. In Figure 4 we have similar results. In particular, the number of observations with a
14Democratic control - Seats held in the Senate by the Democratic party (%)
































Figure 1: Histogram of forcing variable - Democratic control in the Senate








Governor’s strength - Seats held in the Senate by the Governor’s party (%)
































Figure 2: Histogram of forcing variable - Governor’s strength in the Senate








15divided government in the interval (46, 50] is the same as the number of observations with
an uniﬁed government in the interval (50,54]. Figures 3 and 4 give us no reason to believe
in the manipulation of the composition of the lower House around the cutoﬀ.
Democratic control - Seats held in the House by the Democratic party (%)
































Figure 3: Histogram of forcing variable - Democratic control in the House








Given what we observe in Figures 1 to 4 we limit ourselves to using the party control
of seats in the state House as a source for our forcing variables. Since, however, the House
and the Senate have similar powers over the budget, we must look into whether the political
control of the state Senate may be inﬂuencing our results. Speciﬁcally, we show that the
likelihood of the state Senate being controlled by the Democrats is continuous around the
cutoﬀ at Democratic control = 50%, and that the likelihood of the state Senate being uniﬁed
with the Governor is continuous around the cutoﬀ Governor’s strength = 50%. Therefore,
our main results in Sections 3.1 and 4.1 can not be driven by diﬀerences in the political
control of the Senate in either side of the cutoﬀ. The interpretation of our results in Sections
3.1 and 4.1 is the eﬀect of a change in the political control of the state House keeping
16Governor’s strength - Seats held in the House by the Governor’s party (%)
































Figure 4: Histogram of forcing variable - Governor’s strength in the House








everything else constant, including the political control of the state Senate and the partisan
identity of the Governor.
2.4 Estimation Methods
We implement the regression discontinuity design methods following Lee and Lemieux (2009)
and Imbems and Lemieux (2008). In this section, we discuss the estimation methods used,
and we present our main results in Section 3.1 and 4.1.
The discontinuity at the cutoﬀ can in practice be estimated in a number of ways. The
simplest approach is just to compare the average outcomes in a small neighborhood on
either side of the treatment cutoﬀ. The problem with this approach is that it may generate
imprecise estimates since the regression discontinuity method is subject to a large degree of
sampling variability. To rely solely on this approach would require a very large sample size.
17In all of the ﬁgures in this paper, we present local averages in intervals of width 0.5. These
intervals are constructed so that the interval immediately to the left of the 50% cutoﬀ is
(49.5,50]. The interval immediately to the right is (50,50.5]. The local average estimates
are a crude estimate of the discontinuity, but they are a good indicator of the variability of
the data. This can be seen in Figure 5 and 6, where the local averages are similar to the
estimates from the regression methods around the cutoﬀ, which is also the interval with the
highest density.
An equivalent but more eﬃcient method is to estimate two functions: one with observa-
tions to the left of the cutoﬀ and one with observations to the right. The precision of the
estimate depends on how much ﬂexibility we allow the functional form to have. One option
is to impose a parametric structure; we use a diﬀerent quartic polynomial for each side of
the cutoﬀ.14 The advantage of this method is that both estimating the discontinuity and
calculating the standard errors are straightforward. One of our main concerns is that some
of our results are sensitive to the polynomial degree and that this method, as opposed to a
nonparametric estimate, uses data points too far from the 50% cutoﬀ point. In all ﬁgures in
this paper, the solid line indicates the parametrically estimated functions.
Another equivalent alternative is a nonparametric approach.15 This method does not
impose any constraints on the functional form. We follow the standard nonparametric ap-
proach and use local linear regressions with a triangular kernel.16 The local linear regression
14We have experimented with other polynomial degrees and found similar results to our main speciﬁcation
when allowing for a third-degree polynomial or higher. These results are available on request.
15By “equivalent” we mean that conditional on the sample being large enough, all three methods should
estimate the same discontinuity.












where K(.) is the kernel function and h the bandwidth. Let s = xi−x
h , the triangular Kernel is deﬁned as:
K = (1 − |s|), for s ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise.
18method, as argued in Hahn et al. (2001), fairs relatively better at the boundaries than other
methods and therefore is the most appropriate to use with regression discontinuity design.
A local linear regression estimates a regression function at a particular point by using only
data within a bandwidth surrounding this point. The kernel function gives more weight to
the data that are closest to the point being estimated.
Nonparametric results are sensitive to bandwidth choice. Imbens and Kalyararaman
(2009) propose a method to calculate an optimal bandwidth speciﬁcally for regression dis-
continuity design. Because most of our data seem to be concentrated around the 50% cutoﬀ
(see Figures 3 and 4), we apply their method to the data within the medians of the samples
to the left, and to the right of the 50% cutoﬀ. The optimal bandwidth for the subsample
between the two medians is 7 with either Democratic control or Governor’s strength as the
forcing variable.17 At each estimation point, the predicted value by the local linear regression
is denoted by ×.
For the parametric estimates of the discontinuities at the cutoﬀ, we present Huber-White
standard errors robust to clustering by state. To estimate cluster robust standard errors for
the nonparametric estimate, we use the wild cluster bootstrap. This does not require the
residuals to be i.i.d.; nor does it require each cluster to have the same size.18 Cameron et al.
(2008) use Monte Carlo simulations to show that the wild cluster bootstrap works well,
particularly when the number of clusters is small. As is shown in our results, the theoretical
17A bandwidth of 7 implies that the point immediately to the left of the cutoﬀ is estimated with data in
the interval (43, 50], and that the point immediately to the right is estimated with data in the interval (50,
57]. Within these two intervals there are 441 observations, making up 26% of the sample. Out of the 38
states with line item veto, 32 are present. Out of 32, 26 states have observations with both Democratic and
Republican majorities in the state House, and 24 have observations with both Republican and Democratic
Governors. Only four states have only one type of government: Idaho (Democratic uniﬁed), Kentucky
(Republican uniﬁed), Texas (Republican Governor, Democratic House), and West Virginia (Republican
Governor, Democratic House). We have experimented with other bandwidths and the results do not change
much with bandwidths of 3 to 7.






















resample the residuals 10,000 times for each regression. For more on the wild bootstrap, see Horowitz (2001).
19cluster robust standard errors in the parametric estimates are similar to those estimated by
the wild bootstrap procedure with a local linear regression.
3 Democratic Control and the Tax Level
3.1 First Result
In this section, our forcing variable is the percentage of seats controlled by the Democratic
party in the state House, which we call Democratic control. We can see the results in
Figures 5. On the y-axis, we have the state tax level. As the percentage of seats held by
the Democrats moves from the left to the right of the 50% cutoﬀ point, the Democrats gain
a majority in the state lower House. Our estimation shows no signiﬁcant discontinuity in
the tax level even though we have estimated two independent functions, each using data on
only one side of the 50% cutoﬀ. This is our ﬁrst result. Our regression discontinuity design
indicates no causal relationship between the partisan identity of the party controlling the
state lower House and the tax level. As we mentioned in the Introduction, this result goes
against the recent literature that has looked at the question of whether partisan identity
has a causal eﬀect on the tax level in the American states (Reed (2006); Besley and Case
(2003)). On the other hand, this result is similar to the Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) ﬁndings
regarding American Mayors in U.S. cities.
Our result of no discontinuity holds both for the subsample of states with the line item
veto and for the combined sample including both the states with the line item veto and the
states with the block veto. In the main text we present the results for the subsample of
states with the line item veto. We do so to make the comparison with our results in Section
5 easier. In the Appendix, Section A.1 we show results for the combined sample that are are
equivalent to the results in Table 5 and Table 6.
20Table 5: State tax level and Democratic control
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
4-degree polynomials 0.15 - (0.34)
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.11 0.00 (0.30)
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the total
sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP and is shown as a
percentage. The forcing variable is Democratic control - the percentage of seats in the state
House of Representatives that belongs to the Democrats. The discontinuity is estimated at
Democratic control = 50%. Row 1 shows the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side of
the cutoﬀ. Row 2 shows the result for a local linear regression speciﬁcation with a triangular
kernel and a bandwidth of 7. Theoretical cluster robust standard errors are provided for the
polynomial regression together with bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors by state for
the nonparametric regression (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
Democratic control - Seats held in the House by the Democratic party (%)


























Figure 5: State tax level and Democratic control










As we mentioned in Section 2 (see Table 1), the 1960s had a considerably lower average tax
level than the other decades. The ﬁrst robustness check we implement is to exclude all of
the observations from the 1960s. We then continue and exclude one decade at a time. As
can be seen in the Appendix, Section A2 Table 13, the result is robust to each exclusion.
Our result could also have been driven by a particular state. To accommodate this, we
also perform a robustness check excluding one state at a time. The exclusion of no particular
state changes our result; we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant discontinuity in the tax level. This result can
be seen in the Appendix, Section A3, Table 15.
We also check to see if the results in Table 5 hold when we use an alternative measure
for the tax level. We use state tax revenues per capita in 1982-dollars. As in the case with
taxes over GDP in Table 5, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant discontinuity. This result can be seen in
the Appendix, Section A4, Table 17.
3.3 Checking the Validity of the Design
As we showed in Section 2.3 the number of observations on either side of the cutoﬀ is very
similar. This suggests that our forcing variable is not being manipulated at the cutoﬀ. An-
other check for the validity of our design is to see whether any other variable is discontinuous
at the 50% cutoﬀ. If this were the case, it could indicate that our “randomization” does
not work, that is, that observations on both sides of the cutoﬀ are not similar and therefore
we cannot read our results as the lack of a causal link between Democratic control and the
tax level. As we can see in Table 6 we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant discontinuity in any of the other
covariates.19
Row 1 in Table 6 shows that observations on both sides of the cutoﬀ are as likely to have
19In Table 6 we only show the results for the parametric speciﬁcation. The nonparametric speciﬁcation
and the local averages give the same result. These are available on request.
22the Senate controlled by the Democratic party. This is an important result. Even though
the Senate role in setting the budget is as important as that of the House, around the cutoﬀ
at least, the discontinuous change in political control comes from the House only. Row 2
shows a similar result for a variable indicating the partisan identity of the Governor.
Table 6: Covariates and Democratic Control - States with the line-item veto (4-degree poly-
nomial)
Variable Jump at 50% SE
Democratic control Senate -0.02 (0.15)
Democratic Governor -0.07 (0.19)
Turnout -0.02 (0.05)
Midterm election 0.11 (0.12)
Population 0.82 (1.37)
Income per capita 0.44 (1.04)
Unemployment rate 0.03 (0.46)
Local property taxes -0.14 (0.33)
Tax and expenditure limitations 0.03 (0.13)
Supermajority requirements -0.04 (0.08)
State tax level lagged twice 0.19 (0.34)
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. Democratic control Senate takes value
1 if the state Senate is controlled by the Democratic party, and value 0 otherwise. Democratic
Governor takes value 1 if the Governor is a Democrat, and value 0 otherwise. Turnout is deﬁned
as the fraction of the population that turned out to vote in the last election. Midterm election
takes value 1 if the election for that observation was a midterm election, and 0 if the Governor
was also chosen in that election. Population is the state population in millions for a given year.
Income per capita is the state income per capita in thousands of 1982-dollars. Unemployment
rate is the state unemployment rate in a year. Local property taxes is the percentage of a state
average property tax in a year divided by state GDP. Tax and expenditure limitations takes
value 1 if the state has a tax limitation rule in that year, and value 0 otherwise. Supermajority
requirements takes value 1 if the state in that year requires a supermajority to vote for a tax
increase. The forcing variable is Democratic control, which is the percentage of seats in the
state House of Representatives that belongs to the Democratic party. The discontinuity is
estimated at Democratic control = 50% with a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ.
Theoretical cluster-robust standard errors by state are in parentheses.
Finding no discontinuities in variables such as turnout and on the indicator variable for
midterm elections reassures us that our forcing variable is not being manipulated around the
cutoﬀ by voters. As Table 6 demonstrates, elections on both sides of the cutoﬀ are equally
likely to be midterm or simultaneous, and have the same average turnout.
23Discontinuities in variables such as population, income per capita, unemployment rate,
and average local property taxes could indicate that observations on both sides of the cutoﬀ
are not comparable. Let’s focus on income as an example. Since taxes are progressive, richer
states tend to have a higher tax level. If they were disproportionately allocated to the left
of the cutoﬀ, this could drive the average tax level up on the left of the cut oﬀ. Such a
discontinuity on income per capita would be able to explain why we ﬁnd no discontinuity
in the tax level. But because we do not ﬁnd any discontinuity in these variables, as can be
seen in Table 6, we are conﬁdent that our design has worked well.
In row 9 of Table 6 we look at an institutional feature that has been adopted by some of
the states in our sample: tax and expenditure limitations. The majority of these limitations
restrict expenditure growth to increases in income per capita or, in some cases, to inﬂation
and population growth. Some of these limitations also restrict the size of appropriations to
a percentage of state income; whereas some have statutory bounds on expenditure growth
rates.20 We use an indicator variable that takes value 1 should such a rule be in place within
a state during that year, and 0 otherwise. As shown in Table 4 the incidence of observations
with such rules is on average similar on both sides of the cutoﬀ.
In row 10, we look at another institutional feature: supermajority requirement for bills
that imply an increase in tax level.21 In principle, when such a requirement is adopted, it is
no longer enough to hold 50% of seats to formally raise the tax level, which makes dealing
with the observations that have supermajority requirements more problematic than dealing
with other covariates. One option for dealing with the 240 observations with supermajority
requirements is to drop them entirely, which does not change the results.22 Another option
would be to deﬁne the forcing variable as the distance from the cutoﬀ so that the 66.6% cutoﬀ
20For more details, see Waisanen (2008).
21Supermajority requirements were mostly adopted in the 1990s. Some supermajority requirements include
all taxes, but most are less restrictive. For details see Waisanen (2008). For an analysis of their adoption
and the eﬀect on the tax level, see Knight (2000).
22These results are available on request.
24is pooled with the 50% cutoﬀ. However, in the states with supermajority requirements,
the budget is still approved by a simple majority. The two cutoﬀ points are not directly
comparable. We prefer to keep the observations with supermajority requirements and treat
them as another covariate for three reasons. Firstly, not all supermajority requirements
apply to all forms of taxation. Secondly, a state’s tax level may increase either due to
economic growth or due to increased eﬀorts to counter tax evasion, even without a formal
tax hike. Finally, tax cuts do not require a supermajority. As we can see in row 10, we ﬁnd
no discontinuity in the incidence of observations with a supermajority requirement.
In Row 11, we treat the lagged tax level as another covariate. We lag the tax level
twice. This means that for an observation at the current year t, we look at the tax level at
year t − 2. We do so because of the nature of our data. Each election cycle for the state
House of representatives is two years. Our political variables therefore only change every
two years, whereas the tax level changes every year. This means that regressing the current
Democratic control on the tax level lagged once (t − 1) will for half of our observations be
the same as regressing the current Democratic control on the current tax level. Such an
estimation would be partly a repetition of the contemporaneous regression and therefore
would not be a good test of the validity of our design. Finding no discontinuity in the lagged
tax level is an indication that our design works well, and that we can interpret the lack of a
contemporaneous discontinuity in the tax level as the lack of a causal relationship between
Democratic control and the tax level.
4 Governor’s Strength and the Tax Level
4.1 States with the Line Item Veto
Our second result is summarized in Figures 6 and Table 7. We look at the relationship
between the tax level and Governor’s strength, which we deﬁne as the percentage of seats in
25the state House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the current Governor. We
estimate a statistically signiﬁcant jump in the tax level around the cutoﬀ point: Governor’s
strength = 50%. To the right of the cutoﬀ point, the government is uniﬁed; to the left, the
government is divided. The parametric quartic speciﬁcation and the local linear regression
yield very similar results: a discontinuity of around 0.67. This is signiﬁcant at the 1% level
with heteroskedastic robust standard errors, and signiﬁcant at the 10% level with standard
errors robust to clustering by state. For presentation purposes we only report the cluster-
robust standard errors in the paper. An estimate of 0.67 implies an increase in the average
tax level from 5% to 5.67% of GDP - a 13% increase.
Table 7: State tax level and Governor’s strength
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
4-degree polynomials 0.69 - (0.35)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.66 0.60 (0.36)*
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the total sum
of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage.
The forcing variable is Governor’s strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated
at Governor’s strength = 50%. Row 1 shows the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side
of the cutoﬀ. Row 2 shows the result for a local linear regression speciﬁcation with a triangular
kernel and a bandwidth of 7. Theoretical cluster robust standard errors are provided for the
polynomial regression together with bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors by state for
the nonparametric regression (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
In Figure 6, we focus on the data surrounding the discontinuity. One can see the statistical
strength of the estimated discontinuity: the parametric and nonparametric estimates to the
left of the cut oﬀ point lie below all of the local averages to its right in the interval (50, 65],
with one exception. The outlier local average at the 55% mark is due to two observations:
Ohio in 1965 with a tax level of 2.8%, and Ohio in 1966 with a tax level of 2.8%. Similarly,
the estimate to the right of the cutoﬀ is higher than most of the local averages to the left,
with the exception of a few that are far from the cutoﬀ. 23
23A puzzling aspect of Figure 6 is the negative slope to the left of the 50% cutoﬀ. The paper
26Governor’s strength - Seats held in the House by the Governor’s party (%)


























Figure 6: State tax level and Governor’s strength









4.2 States with the Block Veto
Before we discuss the robustness checks and the tests of the validity of our design, we present
in this subsection our result that there is no discontinuity in the tax level in states with the
block veto.
We have only 292 observations for the states with the block veto, unlike the states with
the line item veto, for which we have 1712 observations. Nevertheless, we apply the same
estimation procedures. The results can be seen in Table 8.24 These are in line with the
hypothesis we mentioned in the Introduction that the Governor’s inﬂuence should be less
in the states with the block veto. In the Appendix, Section A5 we show that there are no
de Magalh˜ aes and Ferrero (2011) provides a rational for such a negative slope. For a given governor, as
the size of the opposition increases in the Legislature, the degree of alignment between the Governor and the
majority in the Legislature increase (more people will have voted for both the Governor and the opposing
majority), and so does the amount of transfers.
24The number of states in this sample (9) is too small to meaningfully estimate the variance-covariance
matrix that allows for clustering by state. For example, in the parametric estimate, the number of clusters
is the same as the number of covariates.
27signiﬁcant discontinuities in the covariates, with the exception of the state population. This
is a sign that within the subsample of states with the block veto the regression discontinuity
design is not as robust. The signiﬁcant discontinuity in state population could be a sign of
the lack of validity of this design for the sample of states with the block veto, or simply a
reﬂection of a small sample problem.
Table 8: State tax level and Governor’s strength in states with the block veto
Method Jump at 50% Robust-SE
4-degree polynomials -0.34 (0.28)
LLR(bandwidth 7) -0.21 (0.19)
Note: This sample comprises 292 observations of states with the block veto. Indiana, North
Carolina, New Hampshire, Nevada, and Vermont have the block veto throughout the sample
from 1960 to 2006. Iowa, Washington, and Wyoming switched from the block veto to the line
item veto in 1969; Maine switched in 1995. The dependent variable is the total sum of a state’s
income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage. The
forcing variable is Governor’s strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated
at Governor’s strength = 50%. Row 1 shows the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side
of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parentheses. Row 2
shows the results for a local linear regression speciﬁcation with a triangular kernel. Theoretical
heteroskedastic robust standard errors are provided.
4.3 Robustness Checks
From this subsection onward, we look at the robustness checks and the validity tests for the
results regarding the states with the line item veto in Section 4.1.
Regression discontinuity design and local linear regression estimates are particularly sen-
sitive to outliers, such as Ohio in 1965 and 1966. As mentioned in Section 1 (see Table 1),
the average tax level in our sample was much lower in the 1960s than in any other decade.
The estimated discontinuity could have been driven by a few observations from the 1960s
to the left of the cutoﬀ. In order to eliminate any doubt, we run the same robustness check
as in Section 3.2. We exclude the 1960s and then we exclude one decade at a time. As we
show in the Appendix, Section A2, Table 13, the result is robust to each exclusion.
28Since our estimation methods assume the existence of a cutoﬀ point at 50% and estimate
independent regressions on either side, it could be that our estimation methods (see Section
2.4) would show a signiﬁcant discontinuity by construction. To check for this, we run another
robustness check looking for discontinuities at cutoﬀ points at which we expect there to be
no discontinuity, i.e. Governor’s strength = {45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55}. Even
though these estimates tend to be positive, none is statistically signiﬁcant. See the Appendix,
Section A6, Table 20.
We also check to see if our Table 7 results hold when using an alternative measure for the
tax level. We use state tax revenues per capita in 1982-dollars. The estimated discontinuity
is signiﬁcant with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors for both the polynomial speci-
ﬁcation and the local linear regression. But when using cluster robust standard errors, we
ﬁnd that only the local linear regression with a bandwidth of 7 is signiﬁcant. As can be seen
in the Appendix, Section A4, Table 18, depending on the speciﬁcation, the point estimates
of the discontinuity vary from $92 to $144 per capita. To the left of the cutoﬀ the average
tax revenue per capita is around $700. The discontinuity then implies an increase in the
average tax level that may vary from 13% to 20%. This is in keeping with our estimate of
an increase of 13% in the tax level when using taxes over GDP as our dependent variable.
Because of the small sample around the cutoﬀ, our result could be dependent on a
particular outlier state. To accommodate this, we also perform a robustness check excluding
one state at a time. As can be seen in the Appendix, Section A3, Table 16, the discontinuity
in the tax level remains signiﬁcant.
4.4 Checking the Validity of the Design
In this section, we check the validity of the result described in Section 5.1 by examining
whether our forcing variable, Governor’s strength, is associated with discontinuities in other
covariates at the same 50% cutoﬀ point. In Table 9, we show that there are no signiﬁcant
29discontinuities for most of the covariates.25
One result is worth discussing in more detail. The states’ local property taxes are set
by local authorities and not by the state Legislature. Suppose we had found a discontinuity
in the average local property taxes similar to the discontinuity that we found in Section 4.1
using state-wide taxes. Such a result would have been an indication that the discontinuity
in Section 4.1 is driven by an unobservable variable that inﬂuences all taxes, both local and
state wide, and not by the alignment between the state lower House and Governor. As can
be seen in Table 9, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant discontinuity in the local property tax.
We do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant discontinuity for two covariates: in the indicator variable for a
supermajority constraint and in the lagged tax level. In both cases the discontinuity is not
signiﬁcant when the nonparametric estimation method is used. This can be see in Tables 10
and 11.
In Table 10 the conﬂicting results between parametric and nonparametric estimation may
derive from a combination of the infrequency of the supermajority indicator variable and the
parametric speciﬁcation, which gives more weight to observations far from the cutoﬀ point.
We do not consider the parametric estimates in this case to have enough reliance to aﬀect
the validity of our results. We also note that the results in Section 4.1 are robust to the
exclusion of the 240 observations with supermajority requirements.
In Table 11 we investigate the statistical signiﬁcance of the discontinuity for bandwidths
close to the cutoﬀ. Our main concern with the parametric estimate is that it relies on data
far from the cutoﬀ. We ﬁnd that the estimated discontinuity on the the twice-lagged tax
level is not signiﬁcant when we restrict the data to around the cutoﬀ. We see these results
as an indication that the discontinuity estimated by the polynomials is not robust.
25The nonparametric estimates are available on request.
30Table 9: Other covariates and Governor’s strength - quartic-polynomial speciﬁcation
Variable Jump at 50% SE
Governor’s party control over the Senate -0.05 (0.14)
Democratic Governor -0.21 (0.14)
Turnout -0.03 (0.03)
Midterm election -0.09 (0.11)
Population 0.75 (1.67)
Income per capita 0.19 (0.84)
Unemployment rate 0.00 (0.44)
Local property taxes -0.12 (0.37)
Supermajority requirements -0.15 (0.09)*
Tax and expenditure limitations -0.05 (0.13)
State tax level lagged twice 0.66 (0.35)*
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960
to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. Governor’s party control over
the Senate is an indicator variable taking value 1 if the majority in the Senate belongs to the
Governor’s party, and value 0 otherwise. Democratic Governor takes value 1 if the Governor is
a Democrat, and value 0 otherwise. Turnout is deﬁned as the fraction of the population that
turned out to vote in the last election. Turnout is deﬁned as the fraction of the population
that turned out to vote in the last election. Midterm election takes value 1 if the election for
that observation was a midterm election, and value 0 if the Governor was also chosen in that
election. Population is the state population in millions for a given year. Income per capita
is the state income per capita in thousands of 1982-dollars. Unemployment rate is the state
unemployment rate in a year. Local property taxes is the percentage of a state average property
tax in a year divided by state GDP. Supermajority requirements takes value 1 if the state in
that year requires a supermajority to vote for a tax increase. Tax and expenditure limitations
takes value 1 if the state has a tax limitation rule on that year, and value 0 otherwise. The
forcing variable is Governor’s strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated
at Governor’s strength = 50% with a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical
cluster-robust standard errors by state are in parenthesis.
Table 10: Supermajority requirements and Governor’s strength
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
4-degree polynomials -0.15 - (0.09)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) -0.05 -0.04 (0.04)
Note: This comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960 to 2006.
Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable takes value 1 if
the state has a supermajority requirement for a tax increase (240 observations), and value
0 otherwise. The forcing variable is Governor’s strength, which is the percentage of seats
in the state House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The
discontinuity is estimated at Governor’s strength = 50%. Row 1 shows the results for a 4-
degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster robust standard errors are
provided for the polynomial regression together with bootstrapped cluster-robust standard
errors by state for the nonparametric regression (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
31Table 11: Tax level and lagged tax level on Governor’s strength - diﬀerent bandwidths
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
Current tax level on current Governor’s strength
LLR(bandwidth 3) 0.61 0.65 (0.40)
LLR(bandwidth 4) 0.67 0.68 (0.37)*
LLR(bandwidth 5) 0.69 0.69 (0.37)*
LLR(bandwidth 6) 0.68 0.64 (0.38)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.66 0.60 (0.36)*
Tax level lagged twice on current Governor’s strength
LLR(bandwidth 3) 0.43 0.47 (0.38)
LLR(bandwidth 4) 0.50 0.51 (0.35)
LLR(bandwidth 5) 0.52 0.55 (0.34)
LLR(bandwidth 6) 0.57 0.54 (0.33)
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.55 0.52 (0.32)
Note: This sample comprises state-years with the line item veto from 1960 to 2006. There
are 1644 observations for the set of regressions using the tax level lagged twice, and 1712
observations for the set of regressions using the current tax level. The dependent variable is
the total sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP, current
for the ﬁrst set and twice-lagged for the second set of regressions. The forcing variable is
Governor’s strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives
that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor’s
strength = 50%. Each row shows the results for a local linear regression speciﬁcation with a
triangular kernel and with diﬀerent bandwidths. Bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors
by are provided in parenthesis (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
325 Concluding remarks
Lee et al. (2004) ﬁnd that voters elect policy instead of aﬀecting policy choices by politicians.
They ﬁnd no evidence for convergence of policy platforms as would be predicted by the
median voter model. Our ﬁrst result could at face value go against theirs: we ﬁnd that the
tax level is the same whether the Democrats or the Republicans control the state House.
Others (Besley and Case (2003); Reed (2006); and Leigh (2008)) ﬁnd that the tax level
is the same whether the Governor is a Democrat or a Republican. Interestingly, though,
we ﬁnd that the alignment between a Governor and the majority in the state House leads
to an increase in the tax level. This alignment is measured by party aﬃliation. Parties
are important for our second result. Our conjecture is that parties matter insofar as they
represent a constituency and that when uniﬁed, both Governor and Legislature are able to
cater to the preferences of their speciﬁc constituency with government transfers.26 Such a
model would be in line with Glaeser and Ward (2006), who argue that partisan diﬀerences
are mostly based on religion and culture and less oriented along economic issues.
If the Legislature and the Governor respond to the same constituency, they have no in-
stitutional restraints on raising taxes for everyone and targeting transfers mostly to their
supporters. The incentives to do this are the same whether the uniﬁed government is Demo-
cratic or Republican. The type of expenditure, however, may still be partisan. In another
paper, de Magalh˜ aes and Ferrero (2011) develop this idea further in a simple model of sep-
aration of powers, parties, and redistribution.
26It is not straightforward to identify what these transfers may be and how they divide between party
lines. They could be partisan neutral pork-barrel or they could be expenditures with partisan connotation,
such as school vouchers versus higher salaries to teachers. They must be present in most states and have
the same partisan association in every state. We were unable to ﬁnd speciﬁc expenditure measures that
would allow us to test our conjecture that the composition of expenditure may change whether Democrats
or Republicans are in power.
33A Robustness Check
A.1 Democratic Control and the State Tax Level: All States
Table 12: State tax level, Covariates, and Democratic Control: all states (4-degree polyno-
mial)
Variable Jump at 50% SE
State tax level -0.19 (0.30)
State taxes per capita -36.15 (69.82)
Democratic control Senate -0.05 (0.12)
Democratic Governor -0.08) (0.15)
Turnout -0.01 (0.03)
Midterm election 0.11 (0.11)
Population -1.11 (1.39)
Income per capita -0.16 (0.84)
Unemployment rate 0.09 (0.38)
Local property taxes -0.05 (0.31)
Tax and expenditure limitations 0.00 (0.11)
Supermajority requirements -0.09 (0.07)
State tax level lagged twice -0.16 (0.29)
Note: This sample comprises 2004 observations of states with both the line item veto and the
block veto from 1960 to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. State tax
level is the total sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP
in percentage terms. State taxes per capita is the total sum of a state’s income, sales, and
corporate taxes per capita in 1982-dollars. Democratic control Senate takes value 1 if the state
Senate is controlled by the Democratic party, and value 0 otherwise. Democratic Governor
takes value 1 if the Governor is a Democrat, and value 0 otherwise. Turnout is deﬁned as the
fraction of the population that turned out to vote in the last election. Midterm election takes
value 1 if the election for that observation was a midterm election, and value 0 if the Governor
was also chosen in that election. Population is the state population in millions for a given year.
Income per capita is the state income per capita in thousands of 1982-dollars. Unemployment
rate is the state unemployment rate in a year. Local property taxes is the percentage of a state
average property tax in a year divided by state GDP. Tax and expenditure limitations takes
value 1 if the state has a tax limitation rule on that year, and value 0 otherwise. Supermajority
requirements takes the value 1 if the state in that year requires a supermajority to vote a tax
increase. The forcing variable is Democratic control, which is the percentage of seats in the
state House of Representatives that belongs to the Democratic party. The discontinuity is
estimated at Democratic control = 50% with a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ.
Theoretical cluster-robust standard errors by state are in parentheses.
34A.2 Excluding decades
Table 13: Tax level and Democratic control: one decade excluded at a time (4-degree poly-
nomial)






Note: This sample comprises state-years with the line item veto from 1960 to 2006. We
exclude one decade at a time. Each regression is run with 1369, 1342, 1342, 1346, and 1449
observations, respectively. The dependent variable is the percentage of the sum of income, sales,
and corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage. The forcing
variable is Democratic control, the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that
belong to the Democratic party. The discontinuity is estimated at Democratic control = 50%.
Each row shows the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical
cluster-robust standard errors by state are in parentheses.
Table 14: Tax level and Governor’s strength: one decade excluded at a time (4-degree
polynomial)






Note: This sample comprises state-years with the line item veto from 1960 to 2006. We
exclude one decade at a time. Each regression is run with 1369, 1342, 1342, 1346, and 1449
observations, respectively. The dependent variable is the percentage of the sum of income, sales,
and corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage. The forcing
variable is Governor’s strength, the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives
that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor’s
strength = 50%. Each row shows the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the
cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster-robust standard errors by state are in parentheses.
35A.3 Excluding One State at a Time
Table 15: Tax level and Democratic control: one state excluded at a time (4-degree polyno-
mial)
Excluded Jump at 50% Cluster robust-SE Excluded Jump at 50% SE
AL 0.16 (0.35) AZ 0.12 (0.34)
CO 0.22 (0.35) CT 0.23 (0.35)
DE 0.16 (0.35) FL 0.11 (0.34)
GA 0.16 (0.35) IA 0.22 (0.35)
IL 0.05 (0.37) KS 0.15 (0.35)
KY 0.17 (0.35) LA 0.16 (0.35)
MA 0.06 (0.34) MD 0.17 (0.34)
MI 0.07 (0.36) MO 0.10 (0.35)
MS 0.19 (0.35) MT 0.10 (0.36)
ND 0.20 (0.35) NJ 0.05 (0.34)
NM 0.21 (0.35) NY 0.26 (0.34)
OH 0.12 (0.35) OK 0.23 (0.34)
OR 0.25 (0.34) PA 0.23 (0.40)
SC 0.12 (0.35) SD 0.15 (0.31)
TN 0.14 (0.36) TX 0.17 (0.35)
UT 0.13 (0.35) VA 0.11 (0.35)
WA 0.20 (0.36) WI 0.18 (0.35)
WV 0.09 (0.34) WY 0.22 (0.35)
Note: This sample comprises tate-years with line item veto from 1960 to 2006. Each regression
is run with 1665 observations. The ﬁrst exception is the regression excluding Connecticut, that
has 1669 observations, as Connecticut had fours years with an independent Governor dropped.
The regressions excluding Iowa, Washington and West Virginia have 1674 observations each,
as these states adopted the line item veto in 1969. The dependent variable is the percentage of
the sum of income, sales, and corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP and shown as
a percentage. The forcing variable is Democratic control, the percentage of seats in the state
House of Representatives that belong to the Democratic party. The discontinuity is estimated
at Democratic control =5 0%. In each entry, we exclude from the sample the state in columns
1 or 3. Each row shows the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ.
Theoretical cluster-robust standard errors by state are in parentheses.
36Table 16: Tax level and Governor’s strength: one state excluded at a time (4-degree poly-
nomial)
Excluded Jump at 50% Cluster robust-SE Excluded Jump at 50% SE
AL 0.70 (0.35)* AZ 0.71 (0.35)*
CO 0.72 (0.36)* CT 0.74 (0.36)**
DE 0.73 (0.35)** FL 0.67 (0.35)*
GA 0.69 (0.35)* IA 0.65 (0.35)*
IL 0.64 (0.38)* KS 0.71 (0.36)*
KY 0.66 (0.36)* LA 0.66 (0.36)*
MA 0.57 (0.33)* MD 0.70 (0.35)*
MI 0.70 (0.38)* MO 0.65 (0.35)*
MS 0.74 (0.35)** MT 0.68 (0.37)*
ND 0.72 (0.37)* NJ 0.62 (0.35)*
NM 0.65 (0.35)* NY 0.71 (0.36)*
OH 0.71 (0.35)* OK 0.74 (0.35)**
OR 0.68 (0.36)* PA 0.97 (0.33)***
SC 0.71 (0.35)* SD 0.71 (0.36)*
TN 0.72 (0.36)* TX 0.62 (0.34)*
UT 0.69 (0.35)* VA 0.66 (0.35)*
WA 0.71 (0.37)* WI 0.55 (0.31)*
WV 0.66 (0.35)* WY 0.64 (0.36)*
Note: This sample comprises tate-years with line item veto from 1960 to 2006. Each regression
is run with 1665 observations. The ﬁrst exception is the regression excluding Connecticut, that
has 1669 observations, as Connecticut had fours years with an independent Governor dropped.
The regressions excluding Iowa, Washington and West Virginia have 1674 observations each,
as these states adopted the line item veto in 1969. The dependent variable is the percentage of
the sum of income, sales, and corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP and shown as
a percentage. The forcing variable is Governor’s strength, the percentage of seats in the state
House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is
estimated at Governor’s strength = 50%. In each entry, we exclude from the sample the state
in columns 1 or 3. Each row shows the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the
cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster-robust standard errors by state are in parentheses.
37A.4 Alternative Measure: State Taxes Per Capita
Table 17: Taxes per capita and Democratic control
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
4-degree polynomials 30.75 - (86.56)
LLR(bandwidth 7) 43.93 39.27 (68.82)
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the total sum
of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes per capita in 1982-dollars. The forcing variable is
Democratic control, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that
belong to the Democratic party. The discontinuity is estimated at Democratic control = 50%.
Row 1 shows the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster
robust standard errors are provided for the polynomial regression together with bootstrapped
cluster-robust standard errors by state for the nonparametric regression (wild bootstrap with
10,000 draws each).
Table 18: Taxes per capita and Governor’s strength
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
4-degree polynomials 92.2 - (69.7)
LLR(bandwidth 7) 143.8 116.4 (64.1)*
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the total sum
of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes per capita in 1982-dollars. The forcing variable
is Governor’s strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives
that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor’s
strength = 50%. Row 1 shows the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ.
Theoretical cluster robust standard errors are provided for the polynomial regression together
with bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors by state for the nonparametric regression
(wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
38A.5 Governor’s Strength and Covariates: States with the Block
Veto
Table 19: Other covariates and Governor’s strength: states with the block veto (4-degree
polynomial)
Variable Jump at 50% Robust-SE
Governor’s party control over the Senate -0.17 (0.18)
Democratic Governor -0.15 (0.17)
Turnout -0.03 (0.04)
Midterm election -0.12 (0.20)
Population 0.20 (0.10)**
Income per capita -0.30 (1.54)
Unemployment rate 0.84 (0.53)
Local property taxes -0.53 (0.50)
Tax and expenditure limitations -0.07 (0.16)
Supermajority requirements -0.08 (0.06)
State tax level lagged twice -0.30 (0.30)
Note: This sample comprises 292 observations of states with the block veto from 1960 to 2006.
Each observation represents a state within a year. Governor’s party control over the Senate
is an indicator variable taking value 1 if the majority in the Senate belongs to the Governor’s
party, and value 0 otherwise. Democratic Governor takes value 1 if the Governor is a Democrat,
and value 0 otherwise. Turnout is deﬁned as the fraction of the population that turned out to
vote in the last election. Midterm election takes value 1 if the election for that observation was
a midterm election, and value 0 if the Governor was also chosen in that election. Population
is the state population in millions for a given year. Income per capita is the state income per
capita in thousands of 1982-dollars. Unemployment rate is the state unemployment rate in a
year. Local property taxes is the percentage of a state average property tax in a year divided
by state GDP. Tax and expenditure limitations takes value 1 if the state has a tax limitation
rule on that year, and value 0 otherwise. Supermajority requirements takes value 1 if the state
in that year requires a supermajority to vote a tax increase. The forcing variable is Governor’s
strength, which is the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that belong
to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor’s strength =
50% with a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical heteroskedastic robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
39A.6 Uniqueness of Discontinuity
Table 20: Tax level and Governor’s strength - alternative cutoﬀ points (4-degree polynomial)












Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960
to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the
percentage of the sum of income, sales, and corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP
and shown as a percentage. The forcing variable is Governor’s strength, the percentage of seats
in the state House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The
discontinuity is estimated at diﬀerent cutoﬀ values of Governor’s strength. Each row shows the
results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Cluster-robust standard errors are
in parentheses.
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